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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
CURTIS EDWARD JACKSON, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
NO. 39234 
BONNER COUNTY NO. CR 2009-6579 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Curtis Jackson asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Idaho 
Court of Appeals, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 783 (Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2013) 
(hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that the portion of the Opinion which affirms the 
order denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("Rule 35") motion and denying his motion for 
appointment of counsel was in conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals because, as Judge Lansing's dissent points out, 
Mr. Jackson met his burden to show that appointment of counsel on his Rule 35 motion 
was appropriate. The majority's decision promotes form over substance as it affirms the 
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denial of the motion to appoint counsel because Mr. Jackson was unable to fully 
complete the form Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel provided 
by the prison in, what he at least believed to be, the time limit to file his Rule 35 motion. 
As a result, the majority's opinion on that issue is in contravention of the relevant 
statutes and precedent, and so, this Court should exercise its review authority in this 
case. 
Mr. Jackson also submits that the portion of the Opinion affirming his judgment of 
conviction is contradictory to established Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 
precedent. The Opinion concludes that the potential jurors had offered sufficient 
affirmations of impartiality to cure any expressed biases, even though the juror in 
question qualified those assurances, or the juror in question backtracked on the 
assurance during subsequent questioning. As such, this Court should exercise its 
review authority in this case. 
':t:l:Ji.s~mtng review is granted, Mr. Jackson requests this Court vacate his 
. convlction because he was denied his right to an impartial jury. Alternatively, he 
requests this Court vacate the decision on his Rule 35 motion and remand for a new 
hearing with the assistance of counsel. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Jackson was indicted on three counts of lewd conduct with a person under 
the age of sixteen. 1 (R., pp.27-28.)2 His first jury trial ended in a mistrial when the jury 
1 Specifically, he was alleged to have inappropriately touched an eight or nine-year-old 
~irl with his hands or mouth over the course of several months. (R., pp.27-28.) 
The transcripts provided as part of the record in this case are contained in two 
independently bound and paginated volumes. To promote clarity, "Vol.1" will refer to 
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saw, during their deliberations, an extra portion of one of the exhibits admitted at trial (a 
video of the detective's interview with Mr. Jackson, which was not redacted by the 
State), which informed them that Mr. Jackson had been offered the opportunity to take a 
polygraph examination. (See R., pp.98-100 (minutes from the first trial indicating the 
discussions held on this issue).) The matter was reset for a second jury trial. (See, e.g. 
R., p.108.) The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Jackson as charged.3 (R., pp.147-48.) 
The district court sentenced Mr. Jackson to three concurrent terms of life, with 
fifteen years fixed. (R., pp.177-80.) Mr. Jackson filed a timely Notice of Appeal. 
(R., pp.172-73.) He requested appointment of appellate counsel at public expense 
because he was indigent.4 (R., pp.168, 173.) Mr. Jackson indicated that he had 
exhausted what resources he had in securing trial counsel and had no additional assets 
available to pay for continuing representation. (R., p.168.) With "good cause 
appearing," the district court appointed Mr. Jackson appellate counsel at public expense 
and waived the other costs associated with appeal pursuant to I.AR. 45.1. (R., pp.182-
85.) 
the volume containing the transcripts from the jury trial held from May 9, 2011, through 
May 11, 2011. "Vol.2" will refer to the volume containing the transcript from the 
sentencing hearing held on August 16, 2011. 
3 Mr. Jackson argued on appeal that the district court erred by not dismissing one of the 
potential jurors for cause. However, to promote clarity, the facts relevant to that issue 
will be set forth in Section II of this brief alongside the argument on that issue. 
4 Mr. Jackson had initially been appointed counsel at public cost for the trial, though that 
order was subject to reconsideration "if Defendant is able to post bail." (R., p.21.) After 
Mr. Jackson posted bond, the prosecutor moved to examine Mr. Jackson's financial 
status based on the magistrate's stated condition. (R., pp.46-47.) Based on the 
information presented at the hearing on that motion, the district court determined 
Mr. Jackson was not indigent at that time, and denied him the service of the public 
defender. (See R., pp.50-53.) Mr. Jackson subsequently hired private counsel to 
represent him during the trial. (See R., p.55.) 
3 
Mr. Jackson subsequently filed a pro se motion for a reduction of his sentence 
pursuant to Rule 35 using the form documents provided by the prison. (R., pp.195-97.) 
He also filed a prose motion requesting counsel to assist him with the Rule 35 motion 
with the forms provided by the prison.5 (R., pp.190-92.) The affidavit accompanying the 
request for counsel was not notarized (see R., p.192), but a letter from Mr. Jackson was 
added to the district court's record on December 7, 2012, indicating that he had been 
placed in protective custody at the prison when other inmates assaulted him, and as a 
result, he believed he was unable to arrange a meeting with a notary public or a 
paralegal to complete his affidavit regarding his indigency before the time to file a Rule 
35 motion for leniency expired. (Letter from Defendant to Alexandria Lewis filed 
December 7, 2011.)6 On December 9, 2012, the district court issued its order in regard 
to Mr. Jackson's request for the assistance of counsel in pursuing his Rule 35 motion. 
(R., p.193.) It recognized that he had been found indigent for purposes of appeal and 
that he had no income. (R., p.193.) Nevertheless, it denied his request for counsel 
because the form motion was not properly filled out. (R., p.193.) 
Mr. Jackson continued to attempt to pursue his Rule 35 motion on his own. He 
sent another letter to the district court via a friend, Alan Smith, setting out the claims 
underlying his Rule 35. (Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 
2011, p.13.) Among others things, he asserted that he had been diagnosed with low 
5 Mr. Jackson indicated that he had requested that his trial attorney file a Rule 35 
motion in his case. (Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 2011, 
p.1.) He also indicated that he had not heard whether his attorney had actually done 
so. (Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 2011, p.1.) No motion 
in that regard was filed by trial counsel. (See generally R.) 
6 This letter was attached to the record as a Miscellaneous Exhibit. The same is true of 
the Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 2011, referenced supra. 
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testosterone levels by a Dr. Puffer in Sandpoint, and as a result, he did not have an 
active sex drive.7 (Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 2011, 
p.13.) He contended that this meant he lacked the ability to form the level of desire 
necessary to commit the acts for which he was found guilty, and that this was a factor 
which should have been considered in mitigation. (See Letter from Defendant to Janet 
Meserve filed December 12, 2011, p.13.) The district court, however, denied 
Mr. Jackson's motion for Rule 35 relief, concluding that the sentence was not excessive. 
(R., pp.201-04.) 
On appeal, Mr. Jackson argued that the district court had erred by not appointing 
him counsel to represent him during the Rule 35 proceedings. The Court of Appeals 
split on that issue. Notwithstanding the fact that the district court had made a specific 
finding that Mr. Jackson was indigent in regard to his direct appeal, the majority decided 
that the district court had properly denied the motion because Mr. Jackson did not get 
his financial statement notarized, and that his misunderstanding of how long he actually 
had to file his Rule 35 motion did not constitute sufficient justification for the 
incompleteness of his filings. (Opinion, pp.7-8.) The majority also relied on the fact that 
Mr. Jackson (who was incarcerated at the time) owned vehicles of some value, deciding 
that the district court could properly rely on that fact to find that Mr. Jackson was not 
indigent for purposes of pursuing his Rule 35 motion. (Opinion, p.8 n.3.) Finally, 
looking at the merits of Mr. Jackson's claims, the majority decided the motion for 
counsel could be denied because the motion was frivolous based on its conclusion that 
7 Mr. Jackson indicated that this information had been presented at the first trial, but at 
no other time. (Letter from Defendant to Janet Meserve filed December 12, 2011, p.13.) 
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Mr. Jackson did not present any "admissible evidence" in support of the new information 
he presented to the district court. (Opinion, p.9.) 
Judge Lansing dissented, pointing out that there was sufficient information in the 
record for the district court to determine that Mr. Jackson was, in fact, indigent. 
[Mr.] Jackson submitted a signed statement that was in the form of an 
affidavit, but not notarized, which averred that he was indigent and without 
any funds to hire private counsel and without any bank accounts, stocks, 
bonds, real estate, or any other form of real property .... the record here, 
including [Mr.] Jackson's unnotarized affidavit, indicates that he was 
without financial resources to hire an attorney even for [pursuit of a Rule 
35 motion]. 
(Opinion, pp.10-11.) The dissent also noted that, in regard to the vehicles Mr. Jackson 
owned, "It is not apparent how [Mr.] Jackson could have quickly sold these items from 
his position in the custody of the Department of Correction in order to raise funds to hire 
an attorney." (Opinion, p.11.) In regard to Mr. Jackson's misunderstanding of the time 
he had to file his Rule 35 documents, the dissent pointed out: 
It is not apparent, however, that [Mr.] Jackson was aware of the true filing 
deadline. He was sentenced on August 16, 2011, but the judgment of 
conviction was not entered until September 16, 2011. Rule 35 provides 
that the 120-day time limit for filing a motion begins upon the date of entry 
of the judgment. [Mr.] Jackson may not have realized that the filing of the 
judgment was delayed for a month after the sentencing hearing and 
therefore may have believed that his filing deadline expired in mid-
December. That [Mr.] Jackson was under this misunderstanding about 
the filing deadline is indicated in his letter to Alexandria Lewis where he 
states that he "hopes you will ask the Honorable Steven Verby to appoint 
me counsel and extend the time limit for filling [sic] my Rule 35 by at least 
two weeks or more." 
(Opinion, p.10 n.1.) Finally, in regard to the determination that the motion for counsel 
could be denied because the Rule 35 motion was frivolous, the dissent reminded the 
majority that the standard of review is whether "a person of adequate means would 
have been willing to bring [a similar motion] at his own expense .... it is inappropriate to 
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look solely at the pro se product to determine whether a nonfrivolous motion could have 
been filed." (Opinion, pp.11-12.) Under that standard, the dissent decided, "[g]iven the 
substantial nature of his sentence, I conclude that a person with adequate means to hire 
counsel would have desired to bring a motion for reduction of the sentence at his own 
expense, and therefore it was not frivolous." (Opinion, pp.11-12.) 
Mr. Jackson filed a timely Petition for Review. 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming the denial of 
Mr. Jackson's Rule 35 motion without the appointment of counsel is, as the 
dissent points out, in conflict with the standards set forth in the relevant statutes 
and precedent, and as such, the district court's order denying the appointment of 
counsel should be reversed because Mr. Jackson demonstrated counsel should 
have been appointed. 
2. Whether the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming Mr. Jackson's Judgment 
of Conviction is in conflict with Idaho Supreme Court precedent because 
Mr. Jackson had shown the jury to have been biased, and as such, Mr. Jackson's 
Judgment of Conviction should be reversed because he was deprived of his right 
to an impartial jury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming The Denial Of Mr. Jackson's Rule 35 
Motion Without The Appointment Of Counsel ls, As The Dissent Points Out, In Conflict 
With The Standards Set Forth In The Relevant Statutes And Precedent, And As Such, 
The District Court's Order Denying The Appointment Of Counsel Should Be Reversed 
Because Mr. Jackson Demonstrated Counsel Should Have Been Appointed 
A Introduction 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only 
"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, the decision 
of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme 
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Court. I.AR. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered. Rule 
118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be considered in 
evaluating any petition for review: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance 
not yet decided by the Idaho Supreme Court; 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with 
precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States 
Supreme Court; 
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own 
prior decisions; 
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for 
the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority; and, 
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further 
appellate review is desirable. 
I.AR. 118(b). In this case, Mr. Jackson contends that there are special and important 
reasons for review to be granted. In regard to the question of whether counsel should 
have been appointed to represent Mr. Jackson in regard to his Rule 35 motion, the 
majority opinion is inconsistent with the relevant statutes and precedent. See I.AR. 
118(b)(2)-(3). 
B. As The Dissenting Opinion Correctly Points Out, Mr. Jackson Met His Burden To 
Demonstrate That He Should Be Appointed Counsel To Represent Him On His 
Rule 35 Motion 
The majority's opinion affirming the decision to deny Mr. Jackson counsel on his 
Rule 35 motion enshrines form over substance, and improperly forces incarcerated pro 
se defendants to appreciate technical points in the law in order to exercise their right to 
counsel. When it comes to pro se defendants, the same standards and rules do apply. 
Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 322 (2013), reh'g denied. As 
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such, pro se petitioners are expected to meet deadlines, behave with proper decorum, 
etc. However, this Court has repeatedly warned that, when it comes to the contents of 
filings made by pro se petitioners, 
"the trial court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a 
pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete. Although facts 
sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist, 
they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does 
not know what are the essential elements of a claim." 
Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 653-54 (2007) (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 
679 (2001)); Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004) (same).8 The reason 
behind that rule was best stated as: 
[f]ew indigents can marshal the evidence of mitigating circumstances 
necessary to win a reduction of sentence. Fewer still have the negotiating 
tools to use a [Fed. Rules. Cr. Proc.] 35 motion as a last opportunity to 
exchange cooperation with the prosecution for its support of a lighter 
sentence. . . . [The guidance of counsel] is no less essential [in such 
circumstances]. 
United States v. Morales, 498 F.Supp. 139, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). As such, this Court 
has held: 
The court must also consider whether circumstances prevent the 
petitioner from making a more thorough investigation into the facts. An 
indigent defendant who is incarcerated in the penitentiary would almost 
certainly be unable to conduct an investigation into facts not already 
contained in the court record. Likewise, a prose petitioner may be unable 
to present sufficient facts [supporting his claims]. That showing will often 
require the assistance of someone trained in the law. Therefore, the trial 
8 The Court in Swader, Charboneau, and Brown was specifically reviewing motions for 
appointment of counsel in the post-conviction context. However, given that the 
standard for determining whether to appoint counsel in the post-conviction context is 
virtually identical to the standard for determining whether to appoint counsel in the Rule 
35 context - whether a reasonable person with adequate means would take up the 
action - the rationale from those decision is equally applicable in the Rule 35 context. 
Compare, e.g., Swader, 143 Idaho at 653-54 (articulating the standard for appointing 
counsel in the post-conviction context); with I.C. § 19-852(2)(c) (articulating a virtually 
identical standard in the Rule 35 context). 
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court should appoint counsel if the petition alleges facts showing the 
possibility of a valid claim such that a reasonable person with adequate 
means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation 
into the claim. 
Swader, 143 Idaho at 654-55. Therefore, incompleteness of a filing, particularly by an 
incarcerated pro se defendant, is not usually a reason to reject the claim made in that 
filing. Id.; Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792. This is especially true when the filing at issue 
is the motion requesting assistance of counsel - the Court of Appeals is rejecting the 
defendant's claim because he has not performed like a trained attorney, despite the fact 
that the request at issue is based on the fact that the defendant is asking for the 
assistance of someone trained in the law because of his lack of such training. Swader, 
143 Idaho at 654-55. 
The majority ignored this Court's warning in Swader and Charboneau and held 
that, simply because Mr. Jackson did not ensure that his filings were one-hundred 
percent complete and notarized, the district court's denial of counsel was appropriate. 
(Opinion, p.7.) That decision promotes form over substance, which this Court has 
repeatedly held, is inappropriate. See, e.g., Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 190 
(Ct. App. 2008) ("Idaho appellate courts have long held that, with respect to post-
judgment pleadings filed by convicted defendants, substance governs over form.")9; 
see also State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355 (2004) ("Substance not form governs.") 
(quoting Dionne v. State, 139 Idaho 235, 237 (1969)). There is "a policy of judicial 
fairness" which favors preserving issues for determination on their merits rather than 
9 In fact, in Schwartz, the district court appointed the defendant counsel based on 
a letter, which only stated, "I would like to go over this matter with counsel first." 
Schwartz, 145 Idaho at 188, 190. The substance of that request was honored, 
regardless of the form in which it was presented. See id. 
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penalizing pro se litigants for less-than-proper filings. Weller v. State, 146 Idaho 652, 
655 (Ct. App. 2008). As such, the majority's opinion, which allows for a procedural bar 
to Mr. Jackson's claim for a less-than-proper filing is in direct conflict with prior Idaho 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals precedent. 
The dissent, on the other hand, properly looks to the substance of the filings and 
the evidence in the record to determine that Mr. Jackson had, in fact, demonstrated his 
indigency: 
[Mr.] Jackson submitted a signed statement that was in the form of an 
affidavit, but not notarized, which averred that he was indigent and without 
any funds to hire private counsel and without any bank accounts, stocks, 
bonds, real estate, or any other form of real property .... the record here, 
including [Mr.] Jackson's unnotarized affidavit, indicates that he was 
without financial resources to hire an attorney even for [pursuit of a Rule 
35 motion]. 
(Opinion, pp.10-11.) As this Court pointed out in the post-conviction context, "if [the 
petitioner] alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should 
appoint counsel in order to give the petitioner an opportunity with counsel to properly 
allege the necessary supporting facts." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793. That same 
rationale is applicable in the Rule 35 context. Underlying this rationale is the concept 
that, if the district court felt that it had insufficient information to determine whether 
Mr. Jackson was indigent, it could have requested that he provide the court additional 
information. See id. This is because '"[i]t is essential that the petitioner be given 
adequate notice of the claimed defects so he has an opportunity to respond and to give 
the trial court an adequate basis for deciding the need for counsel based upon the 
merits of the claims."' Swader, 143 Idaho at 654 (quoting Brown, 135 Idaho at 679) 
(emphasis added); see also Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (same). 
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As such, the substance of Mr. Jackson's filings, as the dissent properly 
recognizes, informed the district court that Mr. Jackson did not have sufficient funds 
available to hire an attorney to represent him in the Rule 35 proceedings. (See Opinion, 
p.10.) Therefore, he should have been appointed counsel, and the majority's opinion to 
the contrary is erroneous. 
The majority attempted to deal with that flaw in its reasoning by pointing out that 
Mr. Jackson owned vehicles which were valued at approximately $4,000. (Opinion, p.8 
n.3.) However, the dissent points out the reason why relying on that information is 
erroneous, given the other information in the record: "It is not apparent how 
[Mr.] Jackson could have quickly sold these items from his position in the custody of the 
Department of Correction in order to raise funds to hire an attorney." (Opinion, p.11.) 
The dissent's common sense conclusion echoes this Court's language in 
Swader. "An indigent defendant who is incarcerated in the penitentiary would almost 
certainly be unable to conduct an investigation into facts not already contained in the 
court record." Swader, 143 Idaho at 654. The dissent's analysis makes even more 
sense, given the short window in which a defendant is allowed to file a motion seeking 
leniency. See I.C.R. 35(b) (a motion for leniency must be filed within 120 days of the 
entry of judgment). The majority's position would require a person in jail to find a buyer 
for his property, reach an agreement for the sale, receive the proceeds from that sale, 
locate and hire an attorney, and have that attorney conduct a sufficient investigation so 
that the attorney is able to prepare and present a satisfactory motion for leniency all 
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within 120 days of the entry of judgment. 10 ( See Opinion, pp.6-8.) Such reasoning 
contradicts the applicable holdings from this Court. See, e.g., Swader, 143 Idaho at 
654-55. Dealing with that concern is part of the reason I.C. § 19-854 now provides: 
"The court concerned shall presume that the following persons are indigent persons ... 
Persons who are currently serving a sentence in a correctional facility." I.C. § 19-854 
(emphasis added). And, as the dissent also points out, the district court still had the 
ability to order Mr. Jackson to reimburse the county for the cost of the appointed 
attorney if he had some future ability to repay the county. (Opinion, p.11 n.2 (citing 
1.C. § 19-854(d)).)11 
The majority also relied on its understanding of a technical legal distinction to 
justify its denial of the statutory right to counsel for an incarcerated, pro se petitioner. 12 
Specifically, that distinction relates to when the time to file a motion for leniency 
pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b) really begins. Based on its understanding that the time for 
Mr. Jackson to file his Rule 35 motion was delayed by one month until the written 
Judgment of Conviction was actually filed, the majority held that Mr. Jackson's 
explanation as to why his affidavit in support of his request for the appointment of 
10 Such a stance is particularly troublesome in this case, since Mr. Jackson's ability to 
make such arrangements was further limited by his placement in protective custody 
when he was attacked by other inmates. ( See Letter from Defendant to Alexandria 
Lewis filed December 7, 2011.) 
11 Idaho Code§ 19-854 was amended in 2013. As such, the reimbursement provision 
is now enumerated I.C. § 19-854(7). It provides that "[t]he current inability of the 
indigent person to pay the reimbursement shall not, in and of itself, restrict the court 
from ordering reimbursement." Id. (emphasis added). 
12 In Idaho, criminal defendants have a statutory right to appointment of counsel in Rule 
35 proceedings, provided that their motions for relief are not frivolously made. 
I.C. § 19-852(2)(c); I.C.R. 44; State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 525 
(Ct. App.1994); Murrayv. State, 121 Idaho 918,923 n. 3 (Ct. App.1992). 
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counsel was not notarized was insufficient to justify the incompleteness of his filing. 
(Opinion, p.7.) The dissent points out the incongruity of the majority's holding: 
It is not apparent, however, that [Mr.] Jackson was aware of the true filing 
deadline. He was sentenced on August 16, 2011, but the judgment of 
conviction was not entered until September 16, 2011. Rule 35 provides 
that the 120-day time limit for filing a motion begins upon the date of entry 
of the judgment. [Mr.] Jackson may not have realized that the filing of the 
judgment was delayed for a month after the sentencing hearing and 
therefore may have believed that his filing deadline expired in mid-
December. That [Mr.] Jackson was under this misunderstanding about 
the filing deadline is indicated in his letter to Alexandria Lewis where he 
states that he "hopes you will ask the Honorable Steven Verby to appoint 
me counsel and extend the time limit for filling [sic] my Rule 35 by at least 
two weeks or more." 
(Opinion, p.10 n.1.) Pro se litigants are given some leeway in this regard because 
misunderstandings of such legal distinctions are not uncommon absent legal training. 
See Swader, 143 Idaho at 654-55; Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792; Brown, 135 Idaho at 
679; Morales, 498 F.Supp. at 142. The fact that Mr. Jackson was striving to meet the 
deadline to the best of his abilities, given his understanding of the rules, should have 
been commended, since he sought to file his motion in a timely fashion and requested 
an extension of the deadline, rather than risk filing the documents late. Dealing with 
such technical distinctions in the law is part of the reason to provide counsel in such 
cases. The pro se defendant does not understand all such technical legal 
requirements, so requests the assistance of someone who does. However, the majority 
has refused to provide that assistance precisely because Mr. Jackson did not perform to 
the level of the trained attorney whose assistance he was seeking. 
Finally, in two respects, the majority applies the wrong analysis to determine 
whether the request for counsel could properly be denied because the Rule 35 motion 
was frivolous. First, the majority reviewed the merits of the claims made to determine 
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whether the motion was frivolous. (Opinion, p.9.) In fact, its decision requires indigent, 
incarcerated, pro se defendants to make their ultimate showing of proof simply to 
acquire the assistance of counsel to which they are entitled. (See Opinion, p.9 n.5 
(requiring that Mr. Jackson have presented "admissible evidence" in support of the new 
information he identified in his motion). That position undermines the entire process; 
the point of affording these defendants the right to counsel is to provide them with the 
assistance of counsel so they can make the showing of proof that they are 
underequipped to make on their own. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654-55; Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 792; Morales, 498 F.Supp. at 142. 
As the dissent pointed out, the majority failed to apply the proper standard: "it is 
inappropriate to look solely at the pro se product to determine whether a nonfrivolous 
motion could have been filed." (Opinion, p.12.) Rather, the proper standard is to 
determine whether "it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate 
means would be willing to bring at his own expense." I.C. § 19-852(2)(c). The 
determination of whether the motion is frivolous "must necessarily precede any ruling 
upon the merits of the underlying complaint, motion or petition." Wade, 125 Idaho at 
525 (specifically discussing that rule in terms of the evaluation of a motion for Rule 35 
relief); see also Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 ("[T]he district judge should have first 
determined whether Charboneau was entitled to court-appointed counsel before 
denying the post-conviction relief on its merits."). Whether the arguments made in 
support of that motion were sufficient to merit relief is an issue to be decided after the 
issue of appointment of counsel is resolved, since one of the reasons counsel is 
appointed is to help the pro se defendant perfect his claims and marshal his evidence in 
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support of his claims for presentation to the court. Swader, 143 Idaho at 654-55; 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792; Brown, 135 Idaho at 679; Morales, 498 F.Supp. at 142. 
Applying the proper standard, the dissent decided, "[g]iven the substantial nature 
of [Mr. Jackson's] sentence, I conclude that a person with adequate means to hire 
counsel would have desired to bring a motion for reduction of the sentence at his own 
expense, and therefore it was not frivolous." (Opinion, pp.11-12.) The dissent also 
demonstrates the critical distinction made with this standard: in reaching its conclusion 
regarding whether the motion was frivolous vis-a-vis the request for counsel, it is not 
expressing an opinion about the ultimate outcome of the Rule 35 motion. (Opinion, p.12 
n.3.) The result is that the dissent properly resolves the question of appointment of 
counsel before reaching the merits of the claim. Wade, 125 Idaho at 525. 
The majority's second error in regard to its analysis of whether the claim was 
frivolous arises from its requirement that Mr. Jackson present "admissible evidence" 
with his motion. (Opinion, p.9 n.5.) In State v. Huffman, this Court required that "[w]hen 
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in 
support of the Rule 35 motion." Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) (emphasis added). 
The Huffman requirement is not so stringent as the majority believes. Part of the 
reason to appoint counsel first is to help the defendant, particularly the incarcerated 
defendant, gather and present appropriate and admissible evidence to the district court. 
Swader, 143 Idaho at 654-55; Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792; Morales, 498 F.Supp. at 
142. Therefore, the majority's assertion that the lack of admissible evidence means the 
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claim is frivolous vis-a-vis the appointment of counsel is also contradictory to 
established precedent. 
Given the numerous errors in the majority's holding on the Rule 35 issue, this 
Court should grant review in this case. On review, it should reverse the district court's 
order denying Mr. Jackson's motion for appointment of counsel, and, as such, remand 
the case for further proceedings on his Rule 35 motion. 
Mr. Jackson had a statutory right to counsel during the Rule 35 proceedings. 
I.C. § 19-852(2)(c). He qualified as a needy person under the statute -
I.C. § 19-852(2)(c)13 - since the record demonstrates that he had no resources upon 
which he could immediately draw to hire counsel while he was within the filing period for 
a motion for leniency pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b). (See R., p.168; see also Opinion, p.11.) 
13 Idaho Code § 19-852 has since been renumbered. The portions of I.C. § 19-852 (as 
it existed when Mr. Jackson filed his request for counsel) relevant to this case provide: 
(a) A needy person who ... is being detained under a conviction of[ ] a 
serious crime[ ] is entitled: 
(1) to be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person 
having his own counsel is so entitled; and 
(2) to be provided with the necessary services and facilities of 
representation (including investigation and preparation). The 
attorney, services, and facilities and the court costs shall be 
provided at public expense to the extent that the person is, at the 
time the court determines need, unable to provide for their 
payment. 
(b) A needy person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney under 
subsection (a) is entitled: 
(3) to be represented in any other post-conviction or post-
commitment proceeding that the attorney or the needy person 
considers appropriate, unless the court in which the proceeding is 
brought determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable 
person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own 
expense and is therefore frivolous. 
(c) A needy person's right to a benefit under subsection (a) or (b) is 
unaffected by his having provided a similar benefit at his own expense, or 
by his having waived it, at an earlier stage. 
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His claim was not frivolous, as a reasonable like-situated person with means would 
pursue a motion for leniency. (See R., pp.201-04 (considering the merits of 
Mr. Jackson's Rule 35 claim); see also Opinion, pp.11-12 (the dissenting opinion 
pointing out that a reasonable person with resources facing three life sentences would 
seek leniency under Rule 35).) 
Therefore, the district court's decision to deny Mr. Jackson the assistance of 
counsel in pursuit of his motion for Rule 35 relief violated Mr. Jackson's statutory right to 
an attorney. As a result, this Court should, at least, vacate the order denying 
Mr. Jackson that relief and remand for new Rule 35 proceedings with the assistance of 
counsel. 
II. 
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Jackson's Judgment Of Conviction 
Is In Conflict With Idaho Supreme Court Precedent Because Mr. Jackson Showed The 
Jury To Have Been Biased, And As Such, Mr. Jackson's Judgment Of Conviction 
Should Be Reversed Because He Was Deprived Of His Right To An Impartial Jury 
A. Introduction 
In regard to the Court of Appeals' decision to affirm Mr. Jackson's Judgment of 
Conviction, the Opinion is inconsistent with precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeals, and therefore, this Court should exercise its review authority. 
I.AR. 118(b)(2)-(3). On review, this Court should vacate Mr. Jackson's conviction and 
remand for a new trial. 
B. Relevant Facts 
During voir dire for the second trial, Juror #34 stated that "I think with the nature 
of this case if it's purely his word against hers and that's it, then I would -- yeah I 
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would believe the little girl over the grown man."14 (Tr., Vol.1, p.107, L.22 - p.108, L.2.) 
Juror #33 indicated that he held a similar view. 15 (Tr., Vol.1, p.108, Ls.3-5.) As a result 
of these responses, defense counsel moved to excuse Jurors #33 and #34 for cause. 
The prosecutor followed up with some questions to both potential jurors, which were 
targeted at their understanding of the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.116, L.19 - p.119, L.13.) Juror #33 indicated that he could not hold the 
prosecution to that burden. (Tr., Vol.1, p.118, L.25 - p.119, L.3.) Juror #34 indicated 
she understood that obligation and thought she might be able to hold the prosecution to 
that burden. (Tr., Vol.1, p.118, Ls.4-10.) The prosecutor indicated he had no objection 
to excusing Juror #33 for cause, but objected to excusing Juror #34 for cause. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.119, Ls.15-16.) Juror #33 was excused for cause. (Tr., Vol.1, p.119, 
Ls.17-21.) 
Defense counsel continued his voir dire of Juror #34 in regard to her biases and 
the standard of proof, which culminated with the following exchange: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If you were afraid he did this but you don't think 
[the prosecution] proved it, would you find him guilty anyway? 
A. I guess I would have a hard time if I felt like the prosecution, you know, 
didn't. 
14 The district court and counsel often referred to the jurors by name, rather than 
number during the voirdire process. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, pp.1-144 (the extent of 
the voir dire portion of the trial).) However, to protect the jurors' anonymity, Mr. Jackson 
will refer to them by their numeric designation. 
15 In fact, defense counsel noted that there were several other jurors who raised their 
hands indicating their agreement with Juror #34's views. (Tr., Vol.1, p.100, Ls.19-21.) 
Three were identified on the record: Jurors #17, #28, and #41. ((Tr., Vol.1, p.100, 
L.14- p.101, L.8; Tr., Vol.1, p.105, L.14 - p.107, L.13; see Tr., Vol.1, p.141, L.12 
(identifying Juror #28).) Defense counsel struck Jurors #17, #28, and #41 from the 
panel with peremptory challenges. (Tr., Vol.1, p.141, Ls.3-7; Tr., Vol.1, p.141, Ls.11-13; 
Tr., Vol.1, p.142, Ls.11-13.) 
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And then maybe your job would be to make up 
the difference. 
A. Put forth enough. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So basically the answer would be yes. 
A. Yeah. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If they gave you enough to hang your hat on, 
even if they didn't really prove beyond a reasonable doubt, just to make 
sure, just to make sure, that he doesn't get away with it. 
A. Yeah. I -- you know just because of the nature of the case. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.128, L.17 - p.129, L.8.) Defense counsel renewed his motion to excuse 
Juror #34 for cause. When the prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate Juror #34, the juror 
stated, "I'd like to say that I could follow that oath but with what [defense counsel] was 
proposing, if that were to happen, I don't know if -- if I would be able to just keep that 
beyond a reasonable doubt concrete mindset." (Tr., Vol.1, p.130, Ls.10-14.) The 
district court denied defense counsel's renewed motion to excuse Juror #34 for cause. 
Defense counsel ultimately used one of the defense's peremptory strikes to remove 
Juror #34 from the jury panel. (Tr., Vol.1, p.141, Ls.18-19.) Defense counsel 
also exercised all of Mr. Jackson's peremptory challenges. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.139, 
L.1 - p.143, L.9.) 
Other jurors also spoke to other biases that they harbored. For example, Juror 
#57 requested a private conversation with the district court and counsel. 16 (Tr., Vol.1, 
16 The district court had been allowing some private voir dire of potential jurors so they 
could voice certain concerns about personal matters which might, if discussed in the 
presence of the entire jury pool, taint the jury pool. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.49, 
L.24 - p.50, L.20.) Most of the jurors who requested such private conversations and 
who had personal experiences with similar types of abuse as alleged against 
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p.70, Ls.6-13.) Juror #57 indicated that she had personal experience which was similar 
to that of the alleged victim in this case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.70, Ls.14-15.) The potential juror 
also said that, while she felt confident at that moment of her ability to maintain 
impartiality as a juror, she was not at all confident that she could maintain that 
impartiality once the presentation of evidence and testimony began. (Tr., Vol.1, p.70, 
L.15 - p.71, L.22.) There was no motion to strike Juror #57. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, 
pp.1-144.) In fact, Juror #57 sat as a juror on this case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.144, Ls.14-18.) 
In regard to a different juror, the prosecutor mentioned that he was acquainted 
with the husband and son of Juror #54. (Tr., Vol.1, p.77, Ls.4-5.) He asked Juror #54 
if that relationship would prejudice her as a juror in the case and Juror #54 admitted 
that, "It might." (Tr., Vol.1, p.77, Ls.5-8.) She did clarify that she would try to be fair, but 
she gave no indication that she would be able to set aside her pro-prosecution bias. 
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.77, Ls.9-15; see generally Tr., Vol.1, pp.1-144.) There was no motion 
to strike Juror #54. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, pp.1-144.) Juror #54 also sat as a juror 
on this case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.144, Ls.14-18.) 
On appeal, Mr. Jackson argued that the district court erred by denying his motion 
to remove Juror #34 for cause and that the error was not harmless because Jurors #54 
and #57, who were also biased, actually deliberated in his case. The Court of Appeals 
held that "Juror 34's unequivocal affirmation that she would hold the State to its burden 
and be fair and impartial was sufficient to cure any bias the juror previously expressed." 
(Opinion, p.4 (emphasis added).) It also determined that Jurors #54 and #57 had 
offered similarly-sufficient affirmations of impartiality. (Opinion, pp.5-6.) 
Mr. Jackson were excused from the jury for cause. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.50, 
L.24- p.61, L.20; Tr., Vol.1, p.69, L.3 - p.73, L.18.) 
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C. Per The Standard Set Forth In Precedent, Mr. Jackson Demonstrated That The 
Jury Which Sat In His Case Was lmpermissibly Biased, And Was Thereby 
Deprived Of His Constitutional Right To An Impartial Jury 
The Court of Appeals' decision on the biased jury issue hinges entirely on its 
determination that, by simply being led to say that he or she could be fair to the 
defendant, any taint of bias expressed by a potential juror is completely cured. (See 
Opinion, pp.2-6.) For example, the Opinion states that Juror #57's assertion - "I believe 
I can be impartial" (Tr., Vol.1, p.70, Ls.14-19)-was sufficient to cure her bias (Opinion, 
p.6), even though, when asked by the prosecutor whether she felt able to maintain her 
composure during the trial, Juror #57 qualified her responses. (Tr., Vol.1, p. 70, 
Ls.14-19; Tr., Vol.1, p.71, Ls.13-19.) The Court of Appeals' decision in that regard is 
inconsistent with its own precedent. In State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603 (Ct. App. 2006), 
the Court of Appeals held that, even though the potential juror "agreed to try to be fair, 
but when asked to endorse the idea that everything a police officer says is not 
necessarily true, [the juror] declined," that response was insufficient to lift the taint of 
bias from that juror. Id. at 610-11 (emphasis added). In that scenario, there was "no 
assurance that the juror would lay aside his prejudices and render an impartial verdict." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Just like the juror in Hauser, Juror #57 provided no assurance of impartiality, but 
rather, qualified her responses to the prosecutor's questions on two different occasions. 
Juror #57's first qualification of her impartiality was, "I believe I can be impartial; 
however, I guess my worry would be that you know in this full swing of trial, I don't know 
how I would feel later." (Tr., Vol.1, p.70, Ls.14-19.) Juror #57's second qualification of 
her impartiality, which was in response to the prosecutor's question of whether she 
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could remain impartial during the trial was, "Gosh, I don't know that I could say that 
without having had an experience. But I believe I could just as -- but as a mom, period, 
it would be difficult." (Tr., Vol.1, p.71, Ls.13-19 (emphasis added).) Those statements 
only indicate that she would try to be impartial, they do not provide an assurance that 
Juror #57 could be impartial. Thus, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Juror #57's 
biases had been cured by her purported affirmation of impartiality is directly 
contradictory to established precedent. That is important, since Juror #57 actually 
deliberated in this case. As such, her presence on the jury demonstrates that the 
district court's error of not removing Juror #34 was not harmless. 
First, though, is the question of whether Juror #34 should have been removed for 
cause. The Court of Appeals held that Juror #34 need not have been removed for 
cause because it found that she offered a sufficient affirmation of impartiality which 
cured "any bias the juror previously expressed." (Opinion, p.4.) That determination is 
erroneous for several reasons. 
First, the record indicates that Juror #34's purported assurance of impartiality 
was only in response to rehabilitative questioning on one of her two expressed biases. 
Juror #34's first bias was made evident by her statement that she would believe the 
alleged victim over Mr. Jackson. (Tr., Vol.1, p.107, L.24 - p.108, L.2 ("I think with the 
nature of this case if it's purely his word against hers and that's it, then I would - yeah, I 
would believe the little girl over a grown man.").) Her second bias was made evident by 
her statement that she was unable to assert that she could hold the State to its burden 
of proof. (Tr., Vol.1, p.130, Ls.10-14 ("I'd like to say that I could follow that oath but with 
what [defense counsel] was proposing, if that were to happen, I don't know if -- if I would 
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be able to just keep that beyond a reasonable doubt concrete mind set.") (emphasis 
added).) Her purported affirmation of impartiality immediately followed her statement on 
her second point of bias. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.128, L.17 - p.132, L.2.) Her comments on 
the second point of bias are separated from the comments as to her first point of bias 
by a significant period of time, as well as discussions between the attorneys and other 
jurors on other topics. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, p.108, L.3 - p.126, L.19.) In fact, the 
prosecutor even questioned Juror #34 during that interval and did not secure an 
affirmation of impartiality in regard to the juror's expressed first point of bias. 
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.116, L.19 - p.118, L.14.) As such, there is no logical connection 
linking the purported affirmation of impartiality with the first point of bias, absent a 
specific reference to that issue by either the attorney or the prospective juror. This 
means that Juror #34 never offered an assertion of impartiality in regard to her asserted 
predisposition to believe the alleged victim over Mr. Jackson. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held "Juror 34's unequivocal affirmation that 
she would hold the State to its burden and be fair and impartial was sufficient to cure 
any bias the juror previously expressed."17 (Opinion, p.4 (emphasis added).) The Court 
of Appeals' opinion means that the Juror #34 could have expressed an extreme bias in 
this case - for example, a racial bias against Mr. Jackson, or a bias that, "because he 
17 Juror #34 was anything but unequivocal in her statements concerning her impartiality. 
After telling the prosecutor that she could be impartial (Tr., Vol.1, p.117, L.22 - p.118, 
L.10), Juror #34 backed away from that assertion, telling the Court that "I'd like to say 
that I could follow that oath, but with what [defense counsel] was proposing, if that were 
to happen, I don't know if -- if I would be able to just keep that beyond a reasonable 
doubt concrete mind set." (Tr., Vol.1, p.130, Ls.10-14.) Given the fact that Juror #34 
was waffling back and forth on the question of whether she could remain impartial, her 
answers were not unequivocal or sufficient to cure her expressed biases. Compare 
Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610. 
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was arrested, he must be guilty because the police do not make errors" - but since the 
prosecutor led her to answer "yes" when asked if she could be fair, the expressed bias 
is not a problem. 
Such a position is, of course, wrong. "'Impartiality is not a technical conception. 
It is a state of mind."' Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724-25 (1961) (quoting United 
States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936)). As such, "the juror's assurances that he 
is equal to this task [of impartially rendering a verdict] cannot be dispositive of the 
accused's rights, and it remains open to the defendant to demonstrate 'the actual 
existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of 
partiality."' Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975) (quoting Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723); 
see also State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 70 (2011) (a juror's assurance of impartiality is 
"not always dispositive" in resolving the question of bias); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 
680, 688 (2004) (same); State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 506 (1999) (same). This is 
particularly true when the affirmation is not unequivocal or does not demonstrate an 
ability to "act with entire impartiality .... " Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610. Given Juror #34's 
statements backtracking from her purported assurance of impartiality, the record 
demonstrates that her state of mind was still biased toward Mr. Jackson. As such, the 
Court of Appeals' conclusion that the assurance was sufficient is contrary to long-
established and controlling precedent. 
Rather, the Court of Appeals' Opinion allows jurors who are not able to be truly 
impartial to survive challenges for cause and sit on juries just because they can be led 
to utter certain magic words. That conclusion is in conflict with existing precedent. As 
such, this Court should exercise its review authority. On review, it should vacate 
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Mr. Jackson's conviction and remand for a new trial since the erroneous refusal to 
remove Juror #34 for case was not harmless. 
A defendant has a state and federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial 
jury. U.S. CONST. amend VI; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17. When a defendant has to use a 
peremptory challenge to rectify the district court's erroneous denial of a motion to 
excuse a juror for cause, the United States Supreme Court has held that there is no 
Sixth Amendment right to the use of that peremptory challenge; rather, the focus is 
on the jurors who actually sat on the case and whether they were impartial. 
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85-89 (1988). The Idaho Supreme Court has 
consistently held that, where a biased juror is not excused for cause, that constitutes 
error. See, e.g., Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 353-54 (2011); State v. Ramos, 
119 Idaho 568, 569-70 (1990); State v. Wozniak, 94 Idaho 312, 319 (1971), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 7 (1975). 
However, that error is only reversible if it was not harmless. See, e.g., Ramos, 
119 Idaho at 570 ("[The defendant] has not demonstrated, nor has he even suggested, 
that any of the other jurors remaining on the panel were not impartial or were biased. 
Thus, if there was any error, it was harmless."); Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 354-55 
(reaffirming Ramos in this regard). As such, where a motion to excuse a biased juror 
for cause is erroneously denied and the defendant uses a peremptory challenge to 
remove that potential juror from the panel, that constitutes reversible error if the 
defendant exhausts all his peremptory challenges and a biased juror remains on the 
jury. Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54; Ramos, 119 Idaho at 569-70; see Ross, 487 
U.S. at 89, 90-91. 
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Additionally, there need not be a motion to dismiss the other jurors for cause to 
demonstrate reversible error based on the erroneous refusal to dismiss the challenged 
juror for cause. Rather, the members of the jury panel who sat on the case are 
examined for bias to demonstrate the non-harmless nature of the district court's 
erroneous ruling. 18 See Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570. The simple fact that biased jurors 
sat as members of the jury demonstrates that the panel was not impartial, and 
therefore, the erroneous denial of the motion to dismiss the biased juror for cause 
constitutes reversible error in this case. See id.; Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 354. 
Mr. Jackson has met the Nightengale standard. As discussed supra, the district 
court erred by not removing Juror #34 for cause after it became clear that she was 
18 Whether or not those other jurors should have been on the panel in the first place is 
not the question. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether or not defense counsel moved to 
excuse them from the panel. The mere fact that they remained on the panel after the 
defense exercised all its peremptory strikes and that they had biases against the 
defendant or for the State is all that is required under Ramos and Nightengale. See 
Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570; Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 354. In any case, because of the 
fast-paced, highly-pressured nature of voir dire and challenges of jurors for cause, see, 
e.g., United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316 (2000), the fact that there 
was no objection should not trump the constitutional requirement that the defendant be 
afforded an impartial jury. In any event, the manner in which Mr. Jackson exercised his 
peremptory strikes is irrelevant. See Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54; Ramos, 119 
Idaho at 570. 
While the general rule is that the exercise of peremptory challenges is tactical 
and not questioned on review, see, e.g., State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 
2009), the issue in this case is whether the jury that actually deliberated was impartial. 
Ross, 487 U.S. at 89; Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54. That is not the case, given the 
presence of Jurors #57 and #54 on the jury. Besides, the record demonstrates that 
Mr. Jackson was using his peremptory strikes to remove other potentially biased jurors: 
Juror #34, for example. (Tr., Vol.1, p.141, Ls.18-19.) Defense counsel also exercised 
peremptory strikes on Jurors #17, #28, and #41, each of whom had also indicated that 
they shared Juror #34's bias to believe the alleged victim over Mr. Jackson. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.141, Ls.3-7; Tr., Vol.1, p.141, Ls.11-13; Tr., Vol.1, p.142, Ls.11-13.) Given these 
examples, even if this Court considers the method behind defense counsel's decision to 
peremptorily strike jurors, the fact that Jurors #57 and #54 remained on the panel was 
not harmless. 
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biased against Mr. Jackson and was unable to offer an assurance of impartiality. 19 Two 
of the jurors who sat on the panel (Jurors #54 and #57) had expressed biases against 
Mr. Jackson and had not provided sufficient assurances that they would be able to act 
with entire impartiality in his case. As a result, their presence on Mr. Jackson's 
jury deprived him of his constitutional rights to an impartial jury. See, e.g., 
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365-66 (1966) ("[P]etitioner was entitled to be tried by 
12, not 9 or even 10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors."); Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 
353-54; Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610. Therefore, the district court's erroneous decision to 
not excuse Juror #34 for cause was not harmless. Compare Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 
353-54. As such, his conviction should be vacated for that violation of his constitutional 
rights. See id. 
19 Defense counsel also moved to excuse Juror #33 for cause based on the same 
biases as Juror #34. (Tr., Vol.1, p.107, L.24 - p.108, L.5 (Juror #33 admitting if it were 
just the alleged victim's word against Mr. Jackson, he would believe the alleged victim 
over Mr. Jackson); Tr., Vol.1, p.118, L.25 - p.119, L.3 (Juror #33 admitting that, even if 
he was not convinced Mr. Jackson was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he would still 
convict Mr. Jackson); Tr., Vol.1, p.119, Ls.17-18 (excusing Juror #33 for cause).) The 
only difference between Jurors #33 and #34 was that the prosecutor did not object to 
excusing Juror #34. (Compare Tr., Vol.1, p.119 L.15 with Tr., Vol.1, p.119, Ls.15-16.) 
28 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Jackson respectfully requests that this Court grant review. On review, he 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction based on the jury's bias and 
remand the case for a new trial. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the denial of his Rule 35 motion and remand the case for a hearing with the 
representation of counsel. 
DATED this 5th day of February, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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